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(~~· to U.S.D.C., 
(Holder , J.) 
UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD 
v. 
S.D. Ind. 
FRITZ Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY. The SG appeals from a DC decision holding 
that a classification in the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 
which defines which employees are entitled to retain their ---... 
double-dipping rights, is so arbitrary and capricious that it 
violates due process. 
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2. FACTS. Prior to 1975, an individual who worked for~ 
years in the railroad industry, and who had been employed 
outside the railroad industry for a sufficient period to 
qualify for Social Security benefits could receive benefits 
under both Acts, which totalled more than the benefits receiv 
by employees under either Act who worked the same length of 
time, but did not split the time between railroad and -
nonrailroad work. Congress decided to eliminate this 
double-dipping. This goal was accomplished by the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1974, 45 u.s.c. § 231 et seq. However, 
Congress decided that the expectations of some employees under 
the old scheme should not be frustrated. Thus, the elimination 
of those benefits was to be accomplished gradually. 
Individuals who were retired and receiving benefits by the 
effective date of the Act, Jan. 1, 1975, continued to be 
eligible for 100% of their benefits under the old scheme, as 
did employees with 25-years of railroad service and permanently 
insured by Social Security, but not yet retired. v.;hose still 
working, but not permanently insured ·~ under Social Security on 
Jan. 1, 1975 were denied all dual benefits. Employees not yet 
retired who had more than ten, but less than 25 years of 
service in the railroad industry, and thus were permanently 
insured under the Railroad Retirement Act and who also were 
permanently insured under Social Security, were divided ·into 
two groups. Those who were then currently affiliated with the 
Railroad industry, i.e., who had worked in the industry at 
least one day in 1974~r who had worked in the industry in 12 
of the preceding 30 calendar months, were entitled to the 
\ 
c~ 
..::;;&1\....L..L'- YY.L.&.&Y ..... \A....I-...a.. _.....,,.,'-..._.&.'-• ..._ ... ___ ...... - --- - ---- - - -
1974 received a windfall benefit in a substantially lower· 
amount. The DC estimated that members of appee's class lost 
approximately $88 per month as a result of the classification. 
Petn 25a. 
3. PROCEEDINGS BELOW. Appee, an employee with more than 
10 and less than 25 years of service in the railroad industry, 
who was permanently insured under Social Security in 1974, who 
retired after Dec. 31, 1974, was substituted as plaintiff in a 
suit to compel appt to treat employees with no current 
connection with the railroad industry like employees with the 
same record of service currently with the industry, and a class 
of former railroad workers in appee's situation was 
certified. The DC found the distinction based on current 
connection with the railroad industry arbitrary and not 
rationally related to the purposes of the statute. The DC 
found that the purposes of the 1974 Act were to place the 
I 
Railroad Retirement Fund on a sound actuarial basis and to .. 
protect completely the rights of those persons entitled before 
' Dec. 31, 1974, to receive their full benefits under both Acts • 
. 
Looking to the legislative history, the DC rejected the 
government's suggestion that Congress' purpose was to favor 
"career'' railroad employees over others. Congress treated 
employees with 25 years ' of service as 11 career 11 employees. 
Under the "current ~£filiation'' requirement, an employee with 
20 years of service who left the industry prior to 1974 would 
be ineligible, while a current railroad employee with only 11 





arbitrariness of the classification heightened by the fayt that 
during critical negotiations over the bill which became the 
1974 Act, the labor union deserted appee•s class in order to 
obtain an increase in benefits for persons who were still union 
members. The DC also found that Congress was unaware that it 
had created this distinction which harmed appee•s class, and 
that it was Congress• purpose to protect appee•s class. 
4. CONTENTIONS. The SG argues that the classification is 
not arbitrary. His first argument is that since Congress could 
have eliminated the dual benefit altogether,~' Fleming v. 
Nestor, 363 u.s. 603, 610-11, it was free to choose this 
"reasonable middle ground." His second argument, with which 
there is no dispute, is that no suspect classification is 
involved. _______., 
The SG next attacks the DC 1 s reasoning. First, it was not 
Congress• purpose to protect all "vested" benefits, as the face 
of the statute demonstrates. Although the body which was 
formulated to advise Congress on this matter, the Commission on 
Railroad Retirement, recommended that all "vested" benefits be 
protected, the Joint Labor-Management Negotiation Committee 
suggested a 11 refinement," which was adopted by Congress. 
Further, Congress must be assumed to have been aware of what it 
enacted. 
The SG also argues that the fact that union negotiators may 
have failed fairly to represent the interests of appee•s class 
is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. Next, the SG 
criticizes the DC for commenting that there were other ways to 
- correct the fiscal problems of the railroad retirement system. 
\ 
~1na11y, the SG appears to assert what he believes to be a 
( 
rational basis for the classification: "Congress presumably 
shared the view of the Joint Committee that individuals who 
left the industry had a diminished equitable claim to 
•windfall 1 benefits . " Brief for u.s. at 23. 
Appee argues that the only distinction at issue concerns 
the timing of employees• railroad service and that this 
distinction is irrational. Appee emphasizes that employees 
with more total service in the industry may be deprived solely 
because they left the industry prior to , l974. The 
current-affiliation test does not measure industry loyalty 
{even if such a factor were rational) because most members of 
appee•s class were forced out of railroading by declines in the 
industry. Appee also emphasizes that Congress did not 
understand what it was doing, that Congress was misled by labor 
leaders, and that labor leaders resacrificed" appee•s class. 
Appee contends that the divestiture of appee•s class can be 
directly traced to an increase in benefits to three groups of 
present beneficiaries. 
The Railway Labor Conference and the Railway Labor 
Executives• Association have filed amicus briefs in support of 
the jurisdictional statement. 
5. DISCUSSION. There is an initial problem as to whether 
a three-judge court should have been convened. The original 
complaint was filed before repeal of the three-judge court 
provision. However, the complaint was amended after the 
effective date of the repeal. The DC ruled that the amended 
(~~ complaint did not relate back to the original filing for 
' 
\ 
purposes of the three-judge court provision. The SG agrees. 
The SG notes that relation back is relevant here only for 
purposes of the 3-judge court provision, which is to be 
strictly construed. Appt was named only in the amenQed 
complaint, and the original named plaintiffs did not have 
standing because they were not yet eligible to receive 
benefits. Apparently appee does not contend that a 3-judge 
court should have been convened. I see no reason for the Court 
to remand this case for consideration by a 3-judge court. 
1 
The SG's criticisms of the DC's opinion are legitimate for 
the most part. It is difficult to conclude that Congress ~id 
....__ -----
not intend to divest appee's class when the legislation enacted 
by Congress did so. If Congress really did not intend the 
result seemingly accomplished by the face of the statute, 
perhaps the court should have merely construed the statute 
rather than reaching the constitutional question. Whether 
there were other methods to protect the fiscal integrity of the 
fund seems irrelevant to me. The most effective method would 
have been to eliminate the double benefit entirely for the 
group of employees with appees' length of service in the 
industry. The fiscal effect would have beenthe same if 
Congress had divided the benefit given to those employees with 
a "current affiliation" between the two groups of competing 
employees. Although the overall purpose of the 1974 Act was to 
ensure the fiscal integrity of the fund, I do not think that 
purpose is relevant to the classification drawn here. 
(~ 
(~ 
The SG's attack on the DC st1 1 does not provide a rational 
reason for the classification. I find the "comparative 
equities" justification, which is the onl~ one offered, very 
weak. I also think that it is legitimate for the court 
scrutinizing a statute to examine the process which led to its 
enactment and that the fact that labor negotiators sacrificed 
appees is of some relevance. However, under rational basis 
scrutiny, not much of a justification is required. My 
inclination is that the DC was correct, but a substantial 
enough question is presented that this case probably should be 
noted. 
There is a response and two amicus briefs. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell October 5, 1980 
From: Greg Morgan 
No. 79-870: United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz 
(~r~~JS.~-) 
Question Presented 
In this class action, appellee Fritz challenges the 
constitutionality of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 
u.s.c. § 231b(h). The question is whether § 3(h) of the Act, 
which defines the class of individuals who shall receive a 
"windfall" retirement benefit representing payment from both the 
Railroad Retirement Account and the Social Security Trust Fund, 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Background 
(1) The Railroad Retirement System Before 1975. 
Retirement benefits for railroad employees are paid 
from the Railroad Retirement Account, not from the Social 
.·· 
2. 
Security Trust Fund which pays retirement benefits to employees 
in other industries. Before the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 
took effect on January 1, 1975, individuals who had worked in 
both the railroad industry and another industry were eligible 
for retirement benefits under both the railroad retirement 
system and the social security system. Upon retirement, those 
workers received a "dual" benefit. In 1 97 0, Congress realized 
that the financial mechanics of paying such dual benefits was 
draining the Railroad Retirement Account. (I will not rehearse 
the financial mechanics because they are described sufficiently 
in the briefs and are relatively comprehensible.) Therefore, 
Congress created the Commission on Railroad Retirement to study 
the actuarial soundness of the railroad retirement system. 
(2) The Passage of the Act 
In a report submitted to Congress in 1972, the 
Commission recommended that the payment of dual benefits be 
eliminated. The Commission recognized, however, that some 
railroad employees had retired or made retirement plans upon the 
expectation of receiving dual benefits. Therefore, the 
Commission recommended that a grandfather clause provide for the 
payment of dual benefits to all individuals who had qualified 
for them already. 
After receiving the Commission's recommendations, 
Congress asked representatives of railroad labor and management 
to study the recommendations, to negotiate, and to prepare a 
3. 
bill to restructure the railroad retirement system. These 
representatives formed the Joint Labor-Management Railroad 
Retirement Negotiating Committee. The Committee proposed a bill 
with a narrower grandfather clause than that suggested by the 
Commission. In short, the Committee 1 s proposal eliminated the 
dual benefit for some employees who otherwise would have 
received it upon retirement. Congress passed the Act after 
legislative hearings at which Committee members testified about 
the proposal and specifically about the grandfather clause. 
(3) The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 
The Act divides railroad retirem~ benefits into ~ 
components. One component, called the "social security" ----component, corresponds to the total benefit that an employee -would receive if all of his railroad service had been covered by 
the Social Security Act. The second component, called the 
~ "staff" comp~nt, is a supplemental benefit for service in the 
rai~stry. The social security component is computed on 
the basis of an employee 1 s combined railroad and nonrailroad 
service. However, if the employee is also eligible to receive 
benefits under the Social Security Act (because he has worked 
outside the railroad industry long enough to be permanently 
insured under that Act), then the social security component of 
his railroad retirement benefit is reduced by the amount he is 
paid directly from the Social Security Trust Fund for 
nonrailroad service. This reduct ion eliminates dual benefits, 
4 0 
with the except1on of the grandfather clause described b~ 
The Act's grandfather clause, § 3(h), provides a third 
component, called th~windfall "~ponent, which effectively ~ 
preserves the dual ben employees. But onl~ 
employees with the several qualifications described below ~ 
receive the windfall component. ~ · 
@) 
First, only employees who have fully qualifie&-~ 
for benefits under both the railroad retirement system and the M J_~"l 
social security system as of January 1, 1975, can receive the ~ 
~ <l-~. '7s-
windfall component if they also satisfy other requirements. /--' 
Thus, employees who have not completed 10 years of railroad 
service by that date cannot qualify for the windfall component 
by completing 10 years of service after that date, even if they 
satisfied the other requirements. (~)~ 
Second, only employees who have qualified under 
both systems as of January 1, 197 5, and have retired and are~~ 
receiving dual benefits as of that date, qualify for 
'fl.- d?u-~ 
the 
. df 11 . h . f . h . ~ w1n a component w1t out sat1s y1ng any ot er requ1rements.
~-
Third, employees who have qualified under both 
systems but who have not retired as of January 1, 1975, and 
therefore are not receiving dual benefits as of that date, 
qualify for the windfall component only if they satisfy one of 
three additional requirements as well: 
One, those employees must have a "current 
connection" with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or the 
5. 
later date on which they retire--that is, they must have worked 
for the railroad for 12 of the 30 months preceeding December 31, 
1974, or the later date on which they retire. 
Or two, those employees must have worked for 
the railroad in 1974. 
Or three, those employees must have 
completed 25 years of railroad service as of December 31, 1974. 
Thus, employees who have qualified under both systems 
but who have not retired as of January 1, 197 5, and therefore 
are not receiving dual benefits as of that date, and 
additionally do ~ have a current connection with the railroad 
as of December 31, 1974 or the later date on which they retire, 
did not work for the railroad in 1974, and have not completed 25 
years of service as of December 31, 1974, do not receive the 
windfall component. (For graphic summary, see last page.) 
Put less diagramatically, an individual with more than 
10 years service in the railroad and sufficient nonrailroad work 
to qualify for social security benefits continues to receive a 
dual benefit if he was retired and receiving a dual benefit as 
of December 31, 1974. Also, an individual who has completed 10 
years of railroad service and sufficient nonrailroad service to 
qualify for social security benefits, but who was not retired as 
of December 31, 1974, receives the windfall component if he has 
a current connection with the railroad as ot December 31, 1974 
or the later date of his retirement, or if he worked for the 
b. 
railroad in 1974, or if he had 25 years of railroad service by 
December 31, 1974. fu!_t an unretired individual who worked in 
the railroad for less than 25 years, and who neither worked for 
the railroad in 1974 nor had a current connection with the 
railroad as of December 31, 1974, or his date of retirement, 
does not receive the windfall component even though he has 
completed more than 10 years of railroad service and sufficient 
nonrailroad service to qualify for social security benefits. 
Put in an example, an individual with 11 years of 
railroad work and sufficient work outside the railroad to 
qualify for social security benefits qualifies for the windfall 
component by working for the railroad in 1974, or by having a 
current connection with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or 
his later retirement date. But an individual with 24 years of 
railroad service and sufficient nonrailroad service to qualify 
for social security benefits does not receive the windfall 
component if he is unretired as of January 1, 1975, did not work 
for the railroad in 1974, and did not have a current connection 
with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or his later 
retirement date. 
(4) This Litigation 
Appellee Fritz represents a class of individuals who ~ 
do not qualify for the windfall component. 
1/_/7- . .. ~ ( 
The class consists ~L..-
of individuals who retired after January 1, 1975, who worked for 
the railroad for more than 10 years but less than 25, who left 
7. 
the railroad industry for other employment before 1974, and who 
did not return to the railroad industry and establish a "current 
connection" with it before retiring. Because they do not 
satisfy any one of the three requirements above, they do not 
receive the windfall component even though they performed 
sufficient nonrailroad service to become qualified for benefits 
under both systems by December 31, 1974. 
On cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court be-( Holder, ~. ) held c:ur for the Southern District of Indiana 
that the Act creates an irrational and therefore~~ 
unconstitutional distinction between classes of annuitants. The 
court ordered that members of appellee's class be paid the 
windfall component. The court placed great emphasis on its 
finding that the principal purposes of the Act were to make the 
railroad retirement system actuarially sound and to protect 
completely the dual benefits that railroad employees had already 
earned. In the court's view, the Act's scheme for determining 
which railroad workers would receive the windfall component 
failed to serve either of those purposes. The scheme was found 
not to serve the purpose of making the railroad retirement 
system actuarially sound because the financial need to deprive 
some workers of the windfall component arose only because the 
Committee agreed to increase other workers' benefit. And, 
obviously, the scheme did not serve the purpose of completely 
protecting dual benefits earned by all railroad workers. The 
~-
court also found that the labor representatives on the Committee 
had breached a "duty of fair representation" that they owed to 
appellee and his class. They did so, the court found, by 
increasing future benefits for persons still in the railroad 
industry at the expense of those, such as appellee, who had left 
the industry, and by failing to notify individuals such as 
appellee of the proposed change in benefits. Finally, the court 
found that Congress did not know of the adverse effect of the 
scheme upon workers such as appellee because of misleading 
testimony by Committee members. 
§ 1252. 
This direct appeal comes to the Court under 28 u.s.c. 
D;i.scussion 
(1) The Statutory Scheme 
(a) The Board's Arguments 
Preliminarily, the Board notes that railroad 
retirement annuities are not contractual, and that "Congress may 
alter, and even eliminate, them at any time." Hisquierdo v. 
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 575 (1979). Thus, the Board argues, 
the line which Congress drew to distinguish workers who would 
receive the windfall component from workers who would not is not 
unconstitutional merely because the Court would draw the 1 ine 
differently. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-84 (1976). 
In defense of the line which Congress drew, the Board 
9. 
contends that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the 
achievement of three legislative purposes: 
One, the scheme acknowledges the relative equities of 
the possible recipients of the windfall component. In the 
Board's view, Congress concluded that retired workers already 
receiving dual benefits in 1974 and other present and former 
employees who had 25 years of service in the industry, or had 
worked in the industry in 1974, or had a current connection with 
the industry at the end of 1974, or when they retired, had a 
somewhat stronger equitable interest in receiving the windfall 
than did workers, such as appellee and his class, who had left 
the industry prior to 197 4 and never returned to it before 
retiring. 
Two, the scheme acknowledges career railroad 
employees. Awarding the windfall component to employees with 25 
years of railroad service obviously acknowledges career railroad 
service. The Board contends that the "current connection" test 
for workers with less than 25 years service also acknowledges 
career service because Congress has traditionally used that test 
to ensure some measure of career status as a prerequisite to 
receiving benefits under the railroad retirement system. In 
short, Congress could reasonably determine that workers 
currently connected with the railroad in 1974 when the Act was 
considered and passed, and workers who left the railroad before 
1974 but re-established a current connection with the railroad 
IU. 
before their retirement, were more likely to be career employees 
than those who left the industry before 1974 and never returned 
before retirement. 
Three, the scheme avoids substantial drain on the 
Railroad Retirement Account. The Board contends that Congress 
could legitimately decide that the need to avoid financial 
drain, while preserving the most equitable expectations, 
required that some less equitable expectations not be 
recognized. 
(b) Appellee's Arguments 
Appellee contends that the legislative purposes of the 
Act are not those which the Board suggests, that the statutory 
scheme fai 1 s to serve the true legislative purposes, and that 
the scheme even fails to serve the purposes suggested by the 
Board. 
First, appellee contends that the true legislative 
purposes were to make the railroad retirement system actuarially 
sound and to protect completely the dual benefits of workers who 
had earned them. 
~
Obviously, the scheme fails to protect all the 
dual benefits that had been earned before 1975. Appellee 
contends that the scheme is not rationally related to the 
purpose of making the railroad retirement system actuar ially 
sound because the need to eliminate some dual benefits--that is, 
appellee's and his class's--arose only when the Committee agreed 
to increase the benefits of individuals working in or currently 
-T~ 
I I • 
connected to the railroad in 197 4. Had the Commit tee not so 
agreed, appellee contends, then the railroad retirement system 
could have been made actuar ially sound even while protecting 
appellee's dual benefit. 
Second, appellee contends that the scheme does not 
serve the purposes suggested by the Board. The scheme does not 
acknowledge career service rationally because it measures when 
an individual worked for the railroad, not the length of 
service. Thus, as in the example on page 6, an individual who 
worked for the railroad for only 11 years receives the windfall 
component if one of those years was 1974, but an individual who 
worked for the railroad for 24 years does not receive the 
windfall component if neither 1974 nor the year preceding his 
retirement was one of those years. Examples such as this also 
support appellee's contention that the scheme does not 
acknowledge relative equities in a rational way. 
(c) Analysis 
Without having plumbed the depths of the legislative 
history which both the Board and appellee cite exhaustively, I 
am inclined to conclude that the statutory scheme is rationally 
related to the legislative purpose. To be sure, the case can be 
made that appellee has not asked merely that the Court 
substitute its judgment for Congress', for appellee has 
"advanc [ed] principled reasoning that will at once invalidate 
[the line Congress drew] and yet tolerate a different line 
1~. 
separating some [railroad workers] from others." Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82. The principled reasoning is that length 
~
of service, not occasion of service, reflects career railroad 
employment and acknowledges the relative equities among 
potential recipients of the windfall component. But appellee 
has not shown persuasively that Congress could not have 
..... 
~~------------------ -------
conditioned eligibility for the windfall component upon the 
character of the worker's ties to the railroad as well as upon 
his ties' duration. 
~
See id. at 82-83 ("In short, it is 
unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's 
eligibility [for welfare benefits] depend on both the character 
and the duration of his residence.") Congress clearly wanted to 
grant the windfall component only to workers who had 
substantially served the rail road. Thus, Congress required 10 
years of service as a threshold requirement. At the other 
extreme, Congress presumed that workers who served the railroad 
for 25 years were career railroad employees. For those in the 
middle ground, Congress chose to rely upon criteria other than 
years of service to discern which employees were more like 25-
year employees and which were more like 10-year employees. The 
requirements of a current connection or of work in 1974 are not 
irrational criteria; arguably, they are less arbitrary than a 
flat number-of-years requirement. 
Appellee's contention that Congress wanted to "protect 
completely" all earned dual benefits is not persuasive either. 
I.:S. 
The simple and sufficient answer is that the Commission, not 
Congress, proposed complete protect ion. Congress, by passing 
the Act, must be presumed to have rejected the Commission's 
proposal. 
(2) The Committee's Alleged Misconduct 
The District Court found that the labor 
representatives of the Committee sacrificed the benefits of 
workers who had left the railroad in favor of increased benefits 
for workers who were still connected - with the railroad, and that 
Committee members concealed this sacrifice from Congress. I am 
inclined to dismiss these find}ngs, and the contentions appellee 
c---
makes from them, as irrelevant. Assuming that the labor 
representatives sacrificed the benefits of appellee and his 
class, it is not clear that that action was beyond the 
representatives' authority, for Congress specifically asked 
labor and management "to negotiate" in preparing a bill to 
restructure the railroad retirement system. Even assuming that 
the sacrifice was beyond the Committee's authority, Congress can 
be presumed to have understood and ratified the sacrifice unless 
the evidence shows clearly that the Committee hoodwinked 
Congress. I find appellee's evidence significantly less than 
convincing. 
I recommend reversing the judgment of the District 
Court. 
SECTION 3(h) of the RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT OF 1974 
Individual 
Retired 
& receiving dual 





Requirements for Windfall Component 
qualify for benefits under both 
systems as of 1/1/75, WITHOUT MORE 
qualify for benefits under both 
systems as of 1/1/75 AND: 
(1) work for railroad in 1974 
OR 
(2) have current connection as 
of 12/31/74 or later retire-
ment date 
OR 
(3) have completed 25 years 
railroad service as 
of 12/31/74 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA.Tm 
No. 79-870 
United States Railroad Retire-~ On. Appeal from the United 
ment Board, Appellant, States District Court for 
'V. the Southern District of 
Gerhard H. Fritz Indiana. 
[November -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana held unconstitutional a section of the Railroad 
Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq., and the 
United States Railroad Retirement Board has appealed to 
this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. 
The 1974 Act f,!!ndamentall~ restructured the railroad re-
tirement system. The Act's preaecessor statute, adopted in 
1937, provided a system of retirement and disability benefits 
for persons who pursued careers in the railroad industry, 
Under that statute, a person who split employment between 
railroad and nonrailroad service, and thus qualified for both 
railroad retirement benefits and soeial security benefits, 42 
U. S. C. § 401 et seq., could receive/ retirement benefits 
umler both systems and an accompanying «windfall" benefit.1 
1 Under the old Act, as under the new, 1tll employee who worked 10 
years in the railroad bu::;ine:ss qtmlified for railroad retirement benefits. 
If the employee <Llso worked out::;ide the railroad industry for a ~:>1Jfiicient 
enough time to qualify for social security benefits, he qualified for dual 
benefits. Due to the formula under which 1.hose benefits were computed, 
however, persons who split their employment between railroad and 
nonrailroad employment received dual benefits in excess of the amotmt 
they would have received had they not split their employment. For 
s~~ 
~ 
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'fhe legislative history of the 1974 Act shows that the pay-
ment of windfall benefits threatened the railroad retirement 
system with bankruptcy by the year 1981.2 Congress there-
fore determined to place the system on a "sound financial 
basis" by eliminating future accruals of the windfall bene-
fits.3 Congress also enacted various transitional provisions, 
example, if 10 years of either railroad or nonrajlroad employment would 
produce a monthly benefit of $300, an additional 10 years of t.he same 
employment at the same level of creditable compen:su.tion would uot 
double that benefit, but would increase it uy some les::;er amount to :>ay 
$500. If that 20 year:, of :service had been divided e4ually between 
railro<~d and nonrailroad employment., however, the :social security bene-
fit would be $300 and the railroad ret.iremcnt benefit would also be 
$300, for a total benefit of $600. The $100 differenee in the example 
co11.~tttutes the "windfall" benefit. See generally, S. Rep. No. 93-1163, 
93d Cong., 2cl Se:>:s., 2-3 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1345, 93d Coug., 2d 
&58., 2-3 (1974). 
2 The relevant Connnillce Reports stated "Resolution of the so called 
'dual benefit' problem i:s central both to in:suring the fi:scal :soundness of 
the milroad ret.ircment sy:slcm tutd to c:st.abli:shing equitable retirement 
benefit..; for all railroad employee:;." S. Rep. No. 93-1163, s·upra, at 11 ; 
H. R Rep. No. 93-1345, IJUpm, at 11. The reason for the proulem was 
thaL a financial interchange agreement entered into in 1951 between the 
social security and milroad :sy:slcm,: cau:sed the entire cost. of t.he windfall 
benefitl:l to be borne by tlw railroad Hystem, uot the social ::;ecurity 
sy:>tem. The annual dmin on the milroad ::;y:>Lem amounted to approxi~ 
mately $450 million per year, and if it were not for "the problem of dual 
beneficiaries, the railroad retirement system would be almost completely 
solvent." !d., at 8. 
3 8 . Rep. No. 93-1163, supra, at 1; H. R . Rep. No. 93-1345, supra, at. 1. 
Congress eliminated future accruals of windfall benefits by rstabli:shing 
a two-tier system for benefits. The fir::;t tier is mea~;ured by whnt the 
social security ~ystem would pay on the ba.sis of combiuecl railroad and 
nonrailroad servicP, while the second t.ier is based ou railroad service 
alonr. However, bot.h tier:; are part. of tlw railroad retirement sy::;tem, 
rather limn the fir,.;L tier being placed directly under social security, and 
the bmefit:. actually paid by soctal security on the ba:si;; of nonrailroad 
employment. are deducted so as to eliminate the windfaJl benefit. 
The Railroad Hctireme11t Act of 1974 had its origin:, in 1970 when 
€ongre::;s cre:.tted the Commi:s:sion of Railro;.~,d Het.irement to ::;tudy the 
79-87G-OPINION 
U.S. RAlLIWAD RETIREMENT HD. v. l<'lU'l'Z 3 
including a grandfather provision, § 231 (h)/ which e>tpressly 
preserved windfall benefits for some classes of employees. 
In restructuring the Railroad Retirement Act in 1974, 
actuarial soundness of the raHrond retirement sylltem. The ComtHi:s::;ion 
submitted it:s report in 1972 and identified "dual benefit;:; and their at-
tendant windfall::;" a:; one of the principle CUU::iC::i of the fillllllCiaf JjJiicuft.ieS 
of the railroad retirement ~ystelll. It al:so found that windfall benetit8 
were inequitable, fa,voring those employees who ;;plit their employ• 
ment. over tho;;o employees who ;:;pent their ent.ire ca.reer in the ruilroa.d 
indu::;try. Heport of the Commi;;::;ion on Railroad Retirement, The Hail-
road Ret.ireltlent ~yst.em; It~ Coming Cri::;is, H. Doc. 92-350 (1\:172). lt 
therefore rm·ommet}(led that future accruals of windfall benefits be elimi• 
IHtlcd by the e:;tabli;;lunent of a two-tier ::;y::;tem, somewha.t similar to the 
type of ~;y::;t.em ·eventually adopted by Congre:;::;. It also recommended 
tlmt "legally vested right~ of railroad worker:;" ue pre:;erved. An em-
ployee who WHJ:l fully in:sured lll}(!er both the railroad aml :;ocial security 
::;y~tems as of the clnmgeover date ( i. e., by having at least 10 years of 
railroad employment and requisite length of ~ocial l:*!Curity employment) 
was deemed to have "legally vestetl right~;." 
}'ollowing receipt of the Commi:;:;ion':; report, Congn>::>s reqtte:;ted metu• 
her:> of nHLnagement, l:tbor, and retiree::; to form a Joint Labor iVIanage• 
mcut Railroa.d Retirement Negotiating Committee (hereinafter known as 
the Joint Committee) and :;ubmit a. report, "taking into account" the 
recommendations of the Commi:;:;ion. The Joint Commit.tee outlined its 
proposal:; in the form of a letter to Congress. 120 Cong. Rec. 18391-
18392 (April 10, 1974). Although it agreed with the Commi:s~:~ion that 
future accruals of windfall benefits be eliminated, it differed as to the 
protection to be afforded those already statutorily entitled to benefits and 
recommended the transitional provisions that were eventually adopted 
by Congress. A bill enacting tholle principles was drafted and submitted 
to Congresll, where the relevant committees held lengthy hearings and 
submitted d~tailed reports. SeeS. Rep. No. 93-1163, supra; H. R. Rep . 
No. 93-1345, supra. 
4 Section 3 (h) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C. 
231b (h), provides, in pertinent part : 
" (1) The LUJIOtlllt of the annuity . . . of an individual who (A) will 
have (i) rendered service as an employee to an employer, or as an em-
ployee representative, during the calender year 1974, or (ii) had a cur-
rent connection with the ra.ilroad industry on December 31, 1974, or at 
the time his annuity under section 2 (a) (1) of this Act began to accrue, 
or (iii) completed twenty-five years of service prior to January 1,. 1975, 
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Congress divided emplo ees into various groups.~ those 
employees w o lacked the reqmst 1 years of railroad 
employment to qualify for railroad retirement benefits as of 
January 1, 1975, the changeover date, would have their 
retirement benefits computed under the new system and 
would not receive any windfall benefit. ~hose indi-
viduals already retired and already receiving dual benefits as 
of the changeover date, would have their beuefits computeq 
UtH.ler the ~stern and would continue to receive a windfall 
benefit.G C!JfifiP, those employees who had qualified for both 
railroad and social security benefits as of the changeover date, 
but who had not yet retired as of that date (and thus were 
not yet reeeiviug dual benefits), were entitled to windfall 
benefits if they had ( 1) performed some railroad service in 
1974 or (2) had a "current connection" with the railroad 
or (ii) completed twent.y-tive year;; of S('rvice prior to January 1, 1975, 
ami (B) will have (i) completed ten yl:'ar;; of service prior to January 1, 
1975, and (ii) been pernwnP11t.ly in~ured under the Society Security Act 
on December 31, 1074, shall be incrcwsed by an amouut equal to Lthe 
amount of windfall dual benefit he would have received prior to January 
1, 1975] ..• 
"(2) The amount of the a.unuity ... of an individual who (A) will 
not !awe met the condition:; ~et forth in ;,;ubclau~o (i), (ii), or (hi) of 
clau::;e (A) of ~ubdivi~ion (l) of thi:s suu:section, but (B) will have (i) 
complt>ted ten yt>ar:s of :;ervice prior to .January 1, 1975, and (ii) been 
pPrrnwll:'ntly in:-;ured under the Social St>curity Act as of DPccmber 31 
of t.lw calendar year prior to 1975 in which he last rendered :service as an 
employee to an l:'lllployer, or a:; llll employee repre:;ent~ltive, ;;hall be 
increa..;ed uy an amount equal to t.ho amount ... [of windfall benefit 
calcubtod at time he left the railroad ::;ervice]. ... " 
The relevaut Committee Heports stated that the most "difficult problem" 
was the ''manner in whieh dual bt•uefit" ::;hould be pha;;ed out on an 
equitable ba::;i::;." S. Hep. No. 93-1163, supra, at 11; H. H. Hep. No. 93-
1345, ISUpru, tLt 11. 
5 88 Stat. 1353, ~ee note followiug 45 U. S. C. § 231. The tran:sitiou 
provi;;ion:; in Title 11 of the bill are no~ included in the U. S. Code. The 
windfall amount for retired emplo · ee~ i::; pre::;crved by §§ 204 (a) (3) and 
(4) of the Act. 
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industry as of December 31, 1946/ or (3) completed 25 years 
of railroad ser~ December 31, 1974. 45 1J. S. C. 
§ 231b (h) (1) .~ those emp1oyees who had qualified 
for railroad beuefits as of the changeover date, but lacked a 
current connection with the railroad industry in 1974 and 
lacked 25 years of railroad employment, could obtain a lesser 
amount of windfall benefit if they had qualified for social 
security benefits as of the year (prior to 1975) they left 
railroad employment. 45 U. S. C. § 231b (h)(2).7 
Thus. an individual who, as of the changeover date, was 
uuretired and had 11 years of railroad employment and suffi-
cient nonrailroad employment to qualify for social security 
benefits is eligible for the full windfall amount if he worked 
for the railroad in 1974 or had a current connection with the 
railroad as of December 31, 1974, or his later retirement date. 
But an unretired individual with 24 years of railroad service 
and sufficient nomailroad service to qualify for social security 
benefits does not receive a windfall amount if he did not work 
for the railroad iu 1974 and did not have a current connection 
with the railroad as of December 31, 1974 or his later retire-
ment date. Anti an employee who left the railroad industry 
for other employment before 1974, and who was ueither per-
manently insured under the Social Security Act at that time 
nor returned to the railroad industry to re-establish a "current 
8 The term "current cmmection" is defined in 45 U. S. C. § 231 (o) to 
111ean, in general, employment in the railroad industry in 12 of the pre-
ceding 30 caleu<.ler month~. 
7 The amount of the "windft~ll componl:'nL" h; greater UIH.ler ~:>ubsection 
(1) than under :sub~:>ection (2) of 45 U. S. C. § 23lb (h) . The former 
con~:>isl.:s of benefit,; computl:'d on the ba.~is of ~:>ocial :;ecurity service 
through December 31, 197-l, while the latter i,; computed on the ba:-;is 
of ~:>Ocial :security service only t.hrough the years in which the individual 
left the railroad indu~:>try . The difference eorre:spond:s to the different 
datt>s by which th(' retirrd employ<'e mu~t have been permanent.ly in::mred 
under the Social Security Act in ordt'r to be eligiblf' for an~· windfall 
benefit. 
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connection" with it before retiring, will not receive any wind-
fall benefit, even if he subsequently qualified for social secur-
ity benefits. It was with these complicated comparisons with 
which Congress wrestled in 'f974. 
Appellees filed this class action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Indiana, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that 45 · U. ·s. C. § 231b (h) is uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process CI~use of the Fifth Amend-
ment becaus~ it irrationally distinguishes between classes of 
annuitants.8 The District Court eventually certified a class 
of all persons eligible to retire between January 1, 1975 and 
January 31, 1977, who were permanently insured under the 
Social Security Act as of December 31, 1974, but who were 
not eligible to receive any "windfall component" because 
they had left the railroad industry before 1974, had no "cur-
rent connection" with it at the end of 1974, and had less 
than 25 years of railroad service.0 Appellees contended be-
low that it was irrational for Congress to have drawn a dis-
tinction between employees who had more than 10 years 
but less than 25 years of railroad employment simply on the 
basis of whether they had a "current conuectiou" with the 
railroad industry as of the changeover date or as of the date 
of retirement. 
8 Although "the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, 
it tloel:l forbid discrimiuat.iml that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative 
of due process.'" Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964). Thus, 
if a federal :statute is valid under the Equal Protection Clau:se, it is per-
force valid under the Due Process Clau:;e. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
u.s. 78, 81 (1971). 
9 It is :somewhat unclear precisely who is and is not within the clas:;; 
certified by the Di:strict Court. By its term~, the cla.s.~ certified by the 
District Court would appear to include those employees who qualified 
for reduced wimlfall bcn1~fits under § 2:31b (h) (2) by rea:;on of their 
quulifyiug for :,ociul :security beudits H:l of the year they left. the railroad 
iudu::;try. It. uppPurs, howevPr, that the Di::;trict. Court intended t.o include 
in the cla:ss only those who, like appellee Fritz, are precluded · from ' auy 
windfall benefit. 
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The District Court agreed with appellt>es that a differen-
tiation based solely on whether an employee was "active" 
iu the railroad busiuess as of 1974 was not "rationally re-
lated" to the congressional purposes of insuring the solvency 
of the railroad retirement system and protectiug vested bene-
fits. We disagt·ee anu reverse. 
The only i~ue preseuted by this case is the appropriate l ? 
standard of judicial review to be applied when social and 
economic legislation euacted by Q:mgress is challengetl as 
being violutive of the Fifth Amenument to the Unitt>d States 
Constitution. There is 110 claim here that Cougre:ss ha~:; taken 
propt>rty in violation of the Fifth Amendment. since railroad 
benefits, likt- :social security benefits, are not coutractual and 
may be altered or even eliminated at any time. Hisquierdo 
v. Hisquierdo , 439 F. S. 572, 575 (1~79); Flemndny v. JVestor, 
3o3 U. S. 6o:~. ()08- 611 (1960). Ami because the Jistinctions 
dra·wn in ~ 2:Hb (h) do not burden fundamental constitu-
tional rights or ereate "suspect" cla:ssifications, such as race 
or national origin, WI:' may put ca&•s involving juJicial review 
of such claims to one side. San A nton·io Tndependent School 
Distr·ict v. Rodriyuez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Vance v. Bradley, 
440 U.S. 93 (HI7\J). 
Despite the narrowness of the i::;sue, this Court has not been 
altogether cousistent in its prouounceuteu t in this area. As 
long ago as L-indsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 
61. 78-79 (1911), the Court stated that appropriate staudard 
to be: 
11 1. The equal protectiou doctriue clause of the :Fourteenth 
Amendment does not take from the state the power to 
classify in the a~ptiou of j )olice la\~S. but admits uf the 
ex~rcise of a wide scope of thseretwn in that regard, ami 
avoids ·what is clone only when it is without any reason-
able basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classi-
ficat:m, having so1ue reasonable basis dues uot offend 
against that clau:;e merely because it is not lllade with 
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mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in 
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a 
law is called in question , if any s!_ate of facts reasonably 
can be conceived that would sustaill it, the existeilCe of ...,.___ . 
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must 
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such 
a law must carry the burden of showing that it does 
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary." 
Bv contrast, during an era when the Court was givi11g a broad 
reading to both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protec-
tiou Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate social 
and economic legislation in a way which has siuce been largely 
ab~ncloneil , thi~ Court stated the test more loosely, over the 
dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes. It held that ~ 
classification to be valid under the Equal Protection Clause 
"must rest upon some ground of differences having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation .. . . " 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412. 415 (1920). 'J 
In more recen year , 10wever, we have returned to the 
standard announced in Lindsley and have consistently de-
ferred to egis a 1ve e erminations as to the desirability of 
statutory differentiations. E. g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U. S. 297, 303 (1975); Vauce v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 
(1979). In Flemming v. Nestor,' 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960), 
for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
social security eligibility provision, stating that: 
"it is not within our authority to determine whether the 
Congressional judgment expressed in that section is 
sound or equitable, or whether it comports well or ill with 
purposes of the Act. 'Whether wisdom or unwisdom 
resides in the scheme of benefits set forth in l the Socia 
Security Act] , it is not for us to say. The answer t 
such inquires must come from Congress, not the court . 
@ur concern here., as often, is with power, not with wi 
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dom.' Helvering v. Davis, [303 U. S. 619, 640] . Par-
ticularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncon-
tractual benefit under a social welfare security program 
such as this, we must recognize that the Due Process 
Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the 
statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, 
utterly lacking in rational justification." 
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485-486 (1970), 
the Court rejected a claim that Maryland welfare leg:slation 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It said: 
"In the area of economic and social welfare, a State does 
not violate ~qual Protection Clause merely because 
the classifications made by its law are imperfect. If the 
classification has some 'reasonable basis', it does not of-
fend the Constitution si mply b ecause the classification 
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in prac-
tice it results in some inequality.' Linds1ey v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. 'The problems of 
government are practical ones and may justify, if they 
do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may 
be, and unscientific.' Metropolis 'l'heatre Co. v. City of 
Chicayo, 228 U. S. 61 , 68-70 .. 0 0 
" [The rational basis standard] is true to the principle 
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts 
no power to impose upon the States their views of what 
constitutes ~conomic or social p~cy." 
Where the legislative purpose of the enactment may be 
extremely obscure, it may be ~iate to search for some 
unannoui1c~1:mt underlying 'purpose of tlie statute," arid 
determine whetner e 'fit' etween at purpose and the 
legislature's chosen means of accomplishing that purpose~ 
rational. Here, however, given that the legislative purpose ...____ 
of the statute is readily apparent from the language itself, no 
such undertaking is required. As this Court has stated, the 
? 7 
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appropriate place to look for legislative purpose is the statute 
itself. ifanu v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 294 (197.::..9 J..:.·---~ 
Applying these principles to this case, the plain language :p ~ 
of § 231b (h) indicates that Congress intended that certain 
classes of railroad employees continue to receive full windfall 
benefits. Because Congress could have elimiuated wiudfall 
benefits altogether for classes of employees, it is not consti-
tutionally impermissible for Cougress to have drawn lines 
between groups of employees for the purpose of phasing out 
those benefits. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S., at 305. 
'I'he only remaining inqury is whether Congress achieved its 
purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way. 'I'he classi-
fication here is uot arbitrary, says appellal1t, because it is an 
attempt to protect the relative equities of employees and to 
provide benefits to career railroad employees. Congress fully 
protected, for example, the expectations of those employees 
who had already retired and those unretired employees who 
had 25 years of railroad employment. Conversely, Cougress 
denied all windfall benefits to those employees who lacked 
10 years of railroad employment. Congress additionally pro-
vided windfall benefits, in lesser amount, to those employees 
who had 10 years railroad employmeut if they had qualified 
for social security benefits at the time they had left railroad 
employment, even though they lacked a current connection 
with the industry in 1974. 
'I'hus, the only eligible former railroad employees denied 
all windfall benefits are those, like appellees, who had no 
statutory entitlement to dual benefits at the time they left 
the railroad industry, but thereafter became eligible for dual 
benefits when they subsequently qualified for social security 
benefits. Congress could properly conclude that persons who 
had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall bene-
fits while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater 
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of appel-
lees' class who were no longer in railroad employment when 
' t 
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they became eligible for dual benefits. Furthermore, the 
"current connection" test in not a patently arbitrary mea11s 
for determiniug which employees are "careet· railroaders," 
particularly since the test has been used by Congress else-
where as an eligibility requirement for retirement benefits.10 
Congress could assume that those who had a current cotmec-
tion with the railroad industry when the Act was passed in 
1974, or who returned to the industry before their retirement, 
were more likely thau those who had left the iudustry prior 
to 1974 and who never returned, to be among the class of 
persous who pursue careers i11 the railroad industry. the class 
for whom the Railroad Retirement Act was designed. His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 F. S. 572. 573 (197~J). 
Where, as here, there are plausible rea~:;ous for Congresst 
action, our inquiry is at an eml. It is. of course, "coustitu-
tionally irrelevant whether this reasoning iu fact uuderlay 
the legislative decisiou," Fleming v. 1\'estor, 363 U. S., at 612, 
because this Court has 11evet· insisted that a legislative body 
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This is partic-
ularly true where the legislature must nece~:;sarily engage in 
a process of line clrawing. The "task of classifying person3 
for ... benefits ... iuevitably requires that some perl:lolli3 
who have an almost equally strong claim to favorite treatment 
be placed on different sides of the li11e," M(dhews v. Diaz, 
10 The "current connection" t();;t has been used ;;incc 19-!6 us an 
eligibility requirement for both occupational di~Xtbility and ;;urvivor 
annuitieo~, 45 U. S. C. §§ ::ma (a) (1) (iv), 231a (d) (1) (eh. 70\:J, §§ :203, 
205, 213, 60 St4\t. 726-7;}5), and it ha:-; been u:scd since 1 U66 iu determin-
ing eligibility for a :supplemental annuity. 45 U. S. C. :201a (b)(l) . 
(Pub. L. 89-699, § 1, SO Stat. 107a.) 
Appellees contend th:~t the cunent counrctiun te:>t i~ impermi~~ible 
because it draw~ a di~tinetion not on t.hc duration of rmployllll'llt. but 
mther on the time of employml'lll. But thi~ CourL ha:; clearly held 
that Congres::; may condition eligibility for berwfit~ ~ueh a::; these on the 
character as well as the duration of un Pmployce'::; ties to an indu::;t•ry. 
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 74, n . 4 (1970). 
79-870--0PINION 
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42G U. S. 67, 83-84 (H)70), and the fact the liue might have 
been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legis~ 
lative, rather than judicial, consideration. 
Finally, we disagree with the District Court's conclusion 
that Congress was unaware of what it accomplished or that 
it was mislrcl by the groups that appeared bE>fore it. If this 
test were applied literally to every nwmber of any legis~ 
lature that ever votPd on a law. there would be very ff'w laws 
which would survive it. The language of the statute is 
clear, and we haw h istorieally assumed that Congress in~ 
tcJH!ecl what it rnactf'd. To br sur0, appellet>s lost a political 
battle i11 whieh they hacl a strong interf'st, but this is neither 
tlH' first nor the last tinw that such a result will occur in the 
legislative forum. What we have said is e11ough to dispose 
of the claims that C'oJJgrf'SS not (Hlly failNI to accept appel~ 
le0s argument as to rrstructuring i'll toto, hut that sueh fail~ 
urc' drniNI thrm equal protection of the laws guaranteed by 
thr Fifth Ame1Hlmrnt.11 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 
Court is 
Reversed. 
l1 As wo hn,·c rerrntly stnir<l, "Tho Con~iit .nt ion prr.<nmc~ t.hat. nhscnt 
some rcaFon to infcr autipathy, c\·Pn impmYidrnt. dec:i~ion will c•n•ntually 
be rcct.ified by tho dcnwrratic pror('""<'>' and that. jndiria.l infpn·<·nlion is 
gcncr:dly 1111\\':tJT:Ill kd no mat tcr h01r JJJHri~cly we may I hink a politicul 
brunch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 03, 07 (1070) . 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~u:p-rtutt <qtturt ttf flrt ~b ,~tare~ 
';W~Wfrington.lB. (!}. 20~~~ 
November 10, 1980 
RE: No. 79-870 Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bi 11: 
I will be circulating a separate opinion, probably 
a dissent, in the above in due course. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
I 
C HAMBERS OF 
;$u:p-:rtltt.C Qfcurl ttf tltt ~~ j)taftg 
'J)irltlllp:ttghm. ~. QJ. 2!J.;t'J,$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN November 10, 1980 
Re: No. 79-870 - United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
--
Mr. Justice Re hnquist 





.§u:prmu <!Jourl of t.ltt~nfu~ ~,fattg 
~1Ul1png!Lllt, l!l. <!f. 2ll~.J!..;l 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
November 10, 1980 
RE: No. 79-870, United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill, 





Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.:§uprcnu <!fMttt cf tlrt 'Jbittb tatts 
~usfrington. ~. <q. 2.0p.lt~ 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. 
November 10, 1980 
79-870 u.s. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
I regret to say that your draft opinion's 
discussion of equal protection analysis may make it 
difficult for me to join the opinion in its present form. 
On page 7, the draft reads: 
"The only issue presented by this case is the 
appropriate standard of judicial review to be 
applied when social and economic legislation 
enacted by Congress is challenged as being 
violative of the Fifth Amendment. •• " 
I had not understood that this question actually 
is presented. The parties do not question the standard of 
judicial review. Rather, I understand from the briefs that 
they agree that the appropriate standard is the rational 
basis test, and the issue - as I perceive it - is whether 
the statutory scheme meets that test. I agree that it does. 
But your framing of "the only issue presented" and 
your reliance on the language in Lindsley to the effect that 
"if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that 
would sustain [the legislation]", and your further statement 
that after departing from the Lindsley test we more recently 
have returned to it, gives me a problem in view of what I 
have previously written. 
I am reminded of my effort in Murgia to formulate 
a rational basis standard to which we all could subscribe. 
After getting caught in a "cross-fire", I finally said very 
little beyond the bare statement that the state's 
classification "rationally furthered the purpose identified 
by the state". Subsequently, in Maher v. Roe, again 
avoiding any attempt to "restate" the law of Equal 
Protection, I merely said that the rational basis test 
"requires that the distinction drawn • • . be rationally 
related to a constitutionally permissible purpose." 
2. 
I have never been happy with the "any conceivable 
basis" test applied in Lindsley and McGowan v. Maryland. 
Guessing what legislators "conceivably" might have intended 
does not appeal to me as any standard at all. In a number 
of cases that I wrote somewhat earlier (Weber, James v. 
Strange and Frontiero), I stated my view that "this Court 
requires, as a minimum, that a statutory classification bear 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 
Your opinion does end up stating that a Court must 
determine whether the "fit" between the legislative purpose 
and its means of accomplishing that purpose is "rational". 
But in the same sentence, you also state: / / 
.. ,- "" 
"Where the legislative purpose of the enactment 
may be extremely obscure, it may be appropriate to 
search for some unannounced, but underlying 
1 purpose of the statute 1 • • • ". 
It may be that a majority of the Court will agree 
with what you have written. In that event, I will join the 
judgment and probably write separately. I do think, 
however, that the portions of your opinion mentioned above 
are unnecessary, and that the question as stated by you 
presents an issue not before us. 
Where social and economic legislation are 
concerned, my own disposition is to be tolerant of a 
legislative classification. But in view of what I have 
written, often joined by a majority of the Court, I would be 
uncomfortable with the portions of your opinion I have 
identified. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




~uputttt <!Jlturlltf tlrt ~mu~ ~huts­
Jr~ur~n, !9. <!J. 20,?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
November 12, 1980 
Re: 79-870 - Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
Before receiving Lewis' letter, I had sketched out 
the attached draft of an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. As you will note, I also had concluded that 
your opinion was somewhat misleading because there had 
been no argument addressed to the way in which the 
standard of review should be formulated. 
In all events, this is just a preliminary draft 
which I probably will withdraw if you are able to 
accommodate Lewis, or if he writes a more thorough 
concurrence. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully, 





79-870 - Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the outcome in this 
case depends on the phrasing of the standard for deciding whether 
the statutory classification has a "reasonable basis". See ante, 
at 7, 9. 1 Rather, the decisive questions are (1) whether 
Congress can rationally reduce the vested benefits of some 
1 Neither the District Court nor the appellees even cited 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 u.s. 412; nor did they disagree 
about the phrasing of the appropriate standard of review. The 
court's discussion of what it describes as "the only issue 
presented by this case," ante, at 7, is therefore the purest form 
of dictum. The basis for the District Court's decision is 
summarized in Conclusions of Law 19-20, reading as follows: 
"19. The classification created by the 
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 as defined in 
Conclusion 2 above is not rationally related 
to either the purpose of making the Railroad 
Retirement Fund actuarially sound or the 
purpose of protecting completely those 
persons who were entitled to receive both 
Social Security and Railroad Retirement Act 
benefits under previous law. ~ 
"20. The classification as defined in 
Conclusion 2 above is unconstitutional under 
the equal protection component of the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Such 
classification is arbitrary, capricious and 
irrational and denies Plaintiff Class equal 
protection under the law." Juris. Statement 
30a-3la. 




employees in order to improve the solvency of the entire program 
while it simultaneously increases the benefits of others; and (2) 
whether, in deciding which vested benefits to reduce, it may 
favor annuitants whose railroad service was · more recent than that 
of disfavored annuitants who had an equal or greater quantum of 
employment. 
The first question should be answered affirmatively because 
the congressional purpose to eliminate the windfall benefits is 
unquestionably legitimate, and steps to accomplish that goal 
remain reasonable notwithstanding the need to make an overall 
adjustment in the level of remaining benefits in response to 
inflation in the economy. 
An affirmative answer to the second question is also 
reasonable. Because some hardship--in the sense that legitimate 
expectations are frustrated--will inevitably result from the 
reduction in vested benefits, it was surely reasonable for 
Congress to decide not to eliminate all vested windfall benefits. 
Having made that decision, any distinction within the class of 
vested beneficiaries would necessarily involve a difference of 
~ 
degree rather than a difference in entitlement. Since retirement 
plans frequently provide greater benefits for recent retirees 
than for those who retired years ago--and thus give a greater 
reward for recent service than for past service of equal 
duration--the basis for the statutory discrimination is supported 
by precedent. In my judgment that is a "reasonable basis" as 
No. 79-870 
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that term is used in Linsley, ante, at 8 and Dandridge, ante, at 
9, as well as a "ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation", as those 
words are used in Royster Guano, ante, at 8. 
I, therefore, concur in the judgment. 
t 
November 10, 1980 
79-870 U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bi 11: 
I regret to say that your draft opinion's 
discussion of equal protection analysis may make it 
difficult for me to join the opinion in its present form. 
On page 7, the draft reads: 
"The only issue presented by this case is the 
appropriate standard of judicial review to be 
applied when social and economic legislation 
enacted by Congress is challenged as being 
violative of the Fifth Amendment ••• " 
I had not understood that this question actually 
is presented. The parties do not question the standard of 
judicial review. Rather, I understand from the briefs that 
they agree that the appropr1ate standard is the rational 
basis test, and the issue - as I perceive it - is whether 
the statutory scheme meets that test. I agree that it does. 
But your framing of "the only issue presented" and 
your reliance on the language in Lindale~ to the effect that 
"if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that 
would sustain [the legislation]", and your further statement 
that after departing from the Lindsley test we more recently 
have returned to it, gives me a problem in view of what I 
have previously written. 
I am reminded of my effort in Murgia to formulate 
a rational basis standard to which we all could subscribe. 
After getting caught in a "cross-fire", I finally said very 
little beyond the bare statement that the state's 
classification "rationally furthered the purpose identified 
by the state". Subsequently, in Maher v. Roe, again 
avoiding any attempt to "restate" the law of Equal 
Protection, I merely said that the rational basis test 
"requires that the distinction drawn • • • be rationally 
related to a constitutionally permissible purpose." 
2. 
I have never been happy with the "any conceivable 
basis" test applied in Lindsley and ~cGowan v. Maryland. 
Guessing what legislators "conceivably" might have intended 
does not appeal to me as any standard at all. In a number 
of cases that I wrote somewhat earlier (Weber, James v. 
Strall9.£ and Frontiero), I stated my view that "this Court 
requires, as a minimum, that a statutory classification bear 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 
Your opinion does end up stating that a Court must 
determine whether the "fit" between the legislative purpose 
and its means of accomplishing that purpose is "rational". 
But in the same sentence, you also state: 
"~.qhere the legislative purpose of the enactment 
may be extremely obscure, it may be appropriate to 
search for some unannounced, but underlying 
'purpose of the statute' ••• ". 
It may be that a majority of the Court will agree 
with what you have written. In that event, I w1ll join the 
judgment and probably write separately. I do think, 
however, that the portions of your opinion mentioned above 
are unnecessary, and that the question as stated by you 
presents an issue not before us. 
Where social and economic legislation are 
concerned, my own disposition is to be tolerant of a 
legislative classification. But in view of what I have 
written, often joined by a majority of the Court, I would be 
uncomfortable with the portions of your opinion I have 
identified. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prttnt Qfttu.rl ttf t4t 'J!lnittb ,jbdtll 
jilag!ringtcn. ~. "f. 211~~~ 
November 13, 1980 
Re: No. 79-870 United States Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Fritz 
Dear Lewis: 
I have read your letter of November lOth, and spoken to you 
about it on the telephone. If all claims of constitutional 
invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause were to be decided 
by this Court, I would be able to write the opinion in this case 
with a statement of facts and a series of string citations to 
opinions from this Court, and probably get six or seven votes for 
the opinion without any trouble. For me there are two 
difficulties with this approach to writing the opinion: first, 
the string citations would necessarily include some statements 
that were not consistent with one another, and second, all 
challenges to state or federal legislation on equal protection 
grounds will not be decided by this Court. A district judge or a 
Court of Appeals may therefore pick and choose among the various 
"standards" or "tests", depending on whether it is desired to 
invalidate the statute or sustain it. Granted that it is very 
- 2 -
difficult to define the "rational basis" standard, if we leave 
the case law the way it is now we will, in my opinion, be leaving 
in the hands of four or five hundred lower federal court judges 
an authority very much like a governor's veto: the statute is 
unwise, the legislative "purpose" could have been accomplished in 
a seemingly more fair way, ergo the statute a violates the equal 
protection guarantee. Since each of us was here during the 
agonizing debates over Murgia and Dukes during the October '75 
Term, it may not be possible to get any agreement beyond merely 
saying that the standard in this case is that of a "rational 
basis". · But I would like to make one more effort to indicate 
that it is a legal standard, and not simply a "chancellor's foot" 
veto~ with that in mind, I suggest the following changes in my 
first draft which I am willing to make in response to your letter 
if Potter and Harry, who have already joined the draft, are 
agreeable to them. 
Pages 1 through the first part of 7 would remain as they 
are. 
On page 7, I would rephrase the paragraph beginning at the 
bottom of the page as follows: 
Despite the narrowness of the issue, this Court in earlier 
cases has not been altogether consistent in its pronouncement in 
this area. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 u.s. 61, 
78-79 (1911), the Court said that "When the classification in 
- 3 -
such a law is called in question, if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence 
of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must 
be assumed." 220 u.s. 61, 78-79. On the other hand, only nine 
years later in Royster Guanno Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920), the Court said that for a classification to be valid 
under the Equal Protection Clause it "must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation ••• ". 
In more recent years, however, we have determined that in 
cases involving social and economic benefits, the Court has 
consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds 
legislation which ~ simply deem~ unwise or unartfully drawn. 
Thus in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-486 (1970), 
the Court rejected a claim that Maryland welfare legislation 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It said: 
"In the area of economic and social welfare, 
a State does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause merely because the classifications made by 
its law are imperfect. If the classification has 
some 'reasonable basis', it does not offend the 
Constitution simply because the classification 
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because 
in practice it results in some inequality.' 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 
61, 78. 'The problems of government are 
- 4 -
practical ones and may justify, if they do not 
require, rough accommodations -- illogical, it 
may be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 u.s. 61, 68-70 •••• 
"[The rational basis standard] is true to 
the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives 
the federal courts no power to impose upon the 
States their views of what constitutes wise 
economic or social policy." 
Of like tenor are Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979), and 
New Orelans v. Dukes, 427 u.s. 297, 303 (1975). Earlier, in 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 u.s. 603, 611 (1960), the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the social security eligibility 
provision, saying that : 
"It is not within our authority to determine 
whether the congressional judgment expressed in 
that Section is sound or equitable, or whether it 
comports well or ill with purposes of the Act • 
•... The answer to such inquiries must come from 
Congress, not the Courts. our concern here, as 
often, is with power, not with wisdom." 
And in a case not dissimilar from the present one, in that 
the state was forced to make a choice which would undoubtedly 
seem inequitable to some members of a class, we said: 
•. 
"Applying the traditional standard of review 
under [the Equal Protection Clause], we cannot 
say that Texas' decision to provide somewhat 
lower welfare benefits for AFDC recipients is 
invidious or irrational. Since budgetary 
constraints do not allow the payment of the full 
standard of need for all welfare recipients, the 
... . ~ ' " .. 
~ . :.· .. 
' .. 
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State may have concluded that the aged and infirm 
are the least able of the categorial grant 
recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate 
standard of living. While different policy 
judgments are of course possible, it is not 
irrational for the State to believe that the 
young are more adaptable than the sick and 
elderly, especially because the latter have less 
hope of improving their situation in the years 
remaining to them. Whether or not one agrees 
with this state determination, there is nothing 
in the Constitution that forbids it." Jefferson 
v. Hackney, 406 u.s. 535, 549. 
I would then propose to go over to page 10 of the present 
draft, and, omitting the first two lines on that page, keep pages 
10, 11, and 12 as they are. 
If this or something very much like it would be acceptable 
to you, and to Potter and Harry was well, I would be glad to 
redraft those parts of the opinion which I have discussed. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copy to Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copy to Mr. Justice Stevens 
Sincerely, 
C H AM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u:prtmt <q"curt cf tlp• 'Jilnitt>b .:§tetitg 
~rulfrington.!B. <q. 202)!..;1 
November 13, 1980 
Re: No. 79-870 Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear John: 
Before receiving your letter of November 12th, I 
had spoken to Lewis on the telephone and prepared the 
attached letter to him. While your letter of November 12th 
is technically correct when it says at footnote 1 that 
"Neither the district court nor the appellees even cited 
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412", they do cite 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) which uses the 
Royster language. At any rate, I attach a copy of the 
letter which I have written to Lewis, and sent to Potter 
and Harry after they had joined my proposed opinion, so 
that you may see what the current state of the debate or 
exchange is. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell 
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart 




Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
-------------------------------------' 19--------
;§npuntt Ofttttd ttf tltt 2]ln~itb ~taitll' 
~ag!fing-tttn. ~· <q:. 20,?>!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
November 13, 1980 
Re: 79-870 - Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for sharing your letter to Lewis with 
me. My disagreement with your draft in this case does 
not qualify in the slightest my great respect for your 
cooperative approach to the task of preparing Court 
opinions. 
As I understand your proposed changes, however, I 
you intend to retain the statement on page 7 that the 
"only issue presented by this case is the appropriate 
standard of judicial review •••• " That sentence 
presents me with what is probably an insurmountable 
hurdle. The litigants did not present us with that 
issue but instead did raise other issues; therefore, as 
I presently view the case, I will not be able to join 
an opinion which either contains that statement or is 
organized as a response to a similar statement. In all 
events, I will await the outcome of your negotiations 
with Lewis before trying to put my separate concurrence 
in final form. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Respectfully, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.:§u:puntt ~tntrl cf tltt 'Jfuritt~ .:§hrltg 
~ rur frhtghm. ~. <!J. 20,?'1-~ ' 
November 13, 1980 
Re: No. 79-870, U.S. Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill, 
I have no objection whatever to changes 
in your opinion along the lines specified in 
your letter to Lewis of November 13. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 







To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz: LETTER TO WHR 
Having read your rough-draft letter to Mr. J~~ 
Rehnquist, I offer the following thought: You are entirely 
correct, but you already have won most of the battle. 
~,------~---~--------------------~------~ You are entirely correct that WHR has misstated the 
issue presented and that the discussion of Lindsley and Royster 
Guanno would be unnecessary if the issue were stated as briefed 
and argued. Of course, WHR misstated the issue because he 
~ wished to discuss those cases. However, WHR has conceded most 
of what you sought in your first letter to him by removing much 
of the troublesome language from that discussion. The trouble 
with what remains of that discussion is not that it approves a 
test with which you disagree (I argued this in my memo of 
11/13), but merely that it is unnecessary. For that reason, I 
think that you could join the o inion as its stands revised. 
Let me repeat my agreement with you, however, that 
WHR persists in misstating the issue and that the Lindsley and 
Royster discussion is unnecessary. If you decide to ask again 
for revision, I add one thought: WHR's concern is that lower 
courts today can "pick and choose" from the various "tests" in 
the Court's precedents. Wanting to convey the message that the 
Dandridge - Hackney line of cases contains the test by which 
., 
2 • 
the Court stands today, WHR might do better, as your letter 
suggests, simply to emphasize that line rather than continue 
reiterating the obvious fact that there are inconsistent 
"tests" from which to choose. In short, not only does WHR not 
need to rehearse Lindsley and Royster to make his point, but 
might be disserving his own purpose by airing yet again the 
available "tests." 
In sum, ! would join the revised opinion, especially 
because WHR has gone so far to accommodate your suggested 
revisions. 
I have noted a few typographical mistakes and 
suggested a couple stylistic changes. 
GM 11/13/80 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
I have reviewed Mr. Justice Rehnquist's suggested 
revisions and conclude that they may ease your concerns 
somewhat but perhaps not completely. The revision removes (1) 
the statement that the Court in recent years has "returned to 
the standard announced in Lindsley" [pg 8. ,I 2]; (2) much of 
the language quoted from Lindsley and Flemming to suggest the 
"any conceivable basis" standard [pg. 7-8, & pg. 9]; and (3) 
the statements about legislative "purpose" [pg. 9, ~ 3]. These 
were statements which your letter of Nov. 10 suggested were 
troublesome to you. 
The revision does not remove what I continue to find 
an inaccurate statement of the issue in the case [pg.7, ~2], 
nor does it remove the language from Lindsley which can suggest -the "any conceivable basis" test (" ••• if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived " [pg. 8]). Your Nov. 10 letter 
specifically objected to both of these statements. 
The bottom line is this: The revised opinion quotes 
language from Lindsley suggesting the "any conceivable basis" 
test, but the opinion does not re-affirm that language or 
endorse it as the test which the Court is following in this 
case. Rather, the opinion relies on language from Dandridge 
[pg.3-4 of WHR's letter] and unobjectionable language from 
Flemming [pg. 4 of letter; pg. 8 of first draft] to state the 
test which the Court relies on today. This being so, Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist's re-statement of equal-protection analysis 
is not inconsistent with your statements in previous cases. 
2. 
November 17, 1980 
79-870 u.s. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your letter of November 13, 
proposing changes in the first draft of your opinion for the 
Court. 
To a substantial degree, the suggested changes 
meet my concerns. I would hope, however, that you would 
state the issue as it is presented by the parties. See the 
Question as framed by appellee. 
In view of the changes you have made that 
eliminate the language that presented the greatest 
difficulty for me, I will join your opinion to assure that 
you have a Court. 
I do add this observation: Your concern is that 
lower courts today can "pick and choose" ; among the various 
"tests" found in Court's precedents. I would think the 
best way to convey your message to the contrary is to 
emphasize that certainly since Dandridge/Hackney the Court 
has adhered consistently, with respect to classifications 
involving social and economic benefits, to the 
straightforward rational basis test. Putting it 
differently, apart from being irrelevant as I view them, it 
seems to me that harking back to Lindsley (1911) and Royster 
(1920) could merely divert attention from the consistent way 
in which certainly a majority of the Court has applied the 
rational basis test to legislation of this kind. The 
decisions last Term in Harris v. McRae, and Zbaraz are 
recent examples, although the vote in those cases for 
understandable reasons was close. 
' ' 
·- ~ ' - ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
..§uprttttt <!J:ettrittf tqt ~ttittb- ~hdtg 
~Mlyi:ttgfott, ~. <!):. 2ll,?J!..;l 
Re: No. 79-870 - United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
November 17, 1980 
No word has been forthcoming as yet from the Chief, Byron 
or Thurgood. Thus, at the moment, your ability to command a 
Court depends on accommodation with Lewis and John. 
For what it may be worth, I have no objections to the 
changes you describe in your letter of -November 13 to Lewis. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Powell 




.:§ttpTtmt Qftturl ttf tltt ~tb ;§ta.tt.&' 
~fringhm. ~· (If. 20~~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE November 17, 1980 
Re: 79-870 - u. s. Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 







~u.pt'tlttt Qfcurlllf tqt ~~ ~htltg 
Jlufri:nghtn. ~· OJ. 2il~'!~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
November 17, 1980 




Regards, ), ~sr 
RehnquisV) J 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;§uputttt QJami of f~t %tiL>lt· ;§taftg 
~mrltington. ~. OJ. 20c?'l-.;l 
November 21, 1980 
Re: 79-870, U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. 
Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
The changes that you have made in order to 
accommodate Lewis prompted me to restudy the question 
whether I might join you. I recognize that at this 
stage you may well feel that you've invested enough 
time in trying to accommodate your colleagues, 
particularly since you probably have a Court. 
Nevertheless, I will identify the specific points that 
still trouble me. I will join your opinion if you 
would make the following changes. 
Page 9: In the last line of the text substitute 
the words "provides the answer to" for the words "marks 
the beginning and end of". 
Page 9: Omit footnote 10 entirely. 
Page 11: Rewrite the last few lines of the text 
to read this way: "Where, as here, there are 
acceptable reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is 
at an end. This Court has never insisted that the 
legislative body ..• " 
Page 12, line 5: Substitute "favored" for 
"favorite" and two lines later substitute the date 1976 
for 1970. 
Omit the second sentence in the full paragraph on 
page 12. 
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If I join you, I will of course withdraw my 
separate writing. However, I would thoroughly 
understand if you simply say you've made all the 
changes you intend to make. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: Mr. Justice Powell 
November 21, 1980 
79-870 u.s. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
... 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.;§u.prtmt tgourt of tltt ~nihlt .;§hrug 
2]l!ra.sfrington. tyJ. tg. 20~J!.~ 
November 24, 1980 
J 
Re: No. 79-870 U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz 
Dear John: 
I appreciate your letter of November 21st, suggesting 
additional changes in the second draft of the opinion. I 
had the feeling that in revising that draft as I did in 
accordance with the discussions I had with Lewis, I went 
about as far as I cared to go in the matter. Since Lewis 
has now joined, and I seem to have a Court opinion, I am 
loath to try to make any additional changes that would 
embroil us still further in the Murgia and Dukes discussions 
of October Term, 1975. Therefore, I believe I will let 
the matter rest as is. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, , .~· ·· 
1'\. 
;§n.prtmt <!Jou.rt nf tlrt ~nifdt ~tal:ts 
'ltlasl!ington, ;!D. Qj:. 20?J1;l · 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 4, 1980 
Re: No. 79-870 - U.S. Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz 
Dear Bill: 
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